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Abstract
The synthetic data approach to data confidentiality has been actively re-
searched on, and for the past decade or so, a good number of high quality
work on developing innovative synthesizers, creating appropriate utility mea-
sures and risk measures, among others, have been published. Comparing to
a large volume of work on synthesizers development and utility measures cre-
ation, measuring risks has overall received less attention. This paper focuses
on the detailed construction of some Bayesian methods proposed for estimat-
ing disclosure risks in synthetic data. In the processes of presenting attribute
and identification disclosure risks evaluation methods, we highlight key steps,
emphasize Bayesian thinking, illustrate with real application examples, and
discuss challenges and future research directions. We hope to give the readers
a comprehensive view of the Bayesian estimation procedures, enable synthetic
data researchers and producers to use these procedures to evaluate disclosure
risks, and encourage more researchers to work in this important growing field.
Keywords: Disclosure risks, attribute disclosure, identification disclosure, syn-
thetic data, Bayesian methods
1 Introduction
Statistical agencies collect microdata of respondents (individuals or business establish-
ments) through various censuses and surveys. The agencies then make some versions
of the collected microdata public available, subject to privacy and confidentiality pro-
tection (e.g. Title 13 and Title 26, U. S. Code). The agencies need to protect the
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identity of the respondents, as well as the original attribute information of the re-
spondents which are deemed sensitive. These correspond to identification disclosure
and attribute disclosure respectively.
To provide such protection, at the very least, unique identifiers such as Social
Security Number (SSN) for individuals and Employer Identification Number (EIN)
for business establishments cannot be released in the public available microdata.
Moreover, other seemingly safe attributes cannot be released at the same time either,
because a combination of a small number of attributes would increase the chance of
respondent identification greatly. Sweeney (2000) demonstrated that using 1990 U.
S. Census summary data, 87% (216 million out of 248 million) of the US population
had reported characteristics that likely made them unique based only on {5-digit ZIP,
gender, date of birth}, and about half (53%) are likely to be uniquely identified by
only {place, gengder, date of birth}.
The statistical agencies thus need to mask the microdata before public release.
These masking techniques are called Statistical Disclosure Limitation (SDL) tech-
niques, which include i) data swapping, ii) adding random noise, and iii) micro-
aggregation, among others. Hundepool et al. (2012) provides a comprehensive review
of the SDL techniques for microdata. Though these methods or combinations of them
could provide some level of privacy protection, the utility of the masked data (e.g.
results from a regression analysis using the masked data should be close to that using
the original confidential data) are compromised (Raghunathan et al., 2003). More-
over, for large and complex surveys, such SDL techniques need to be applied at a
high intensity, which is time-consuming and hurting the utility of final masked data.
One alternative to the SDL techniques is synthetic data. Based on the theory and
applications of multiple imputation methodology for missing data problems (Rubin,
1987), multiply-imputed synthetic data can be generated from the statistical models
estimated from the original confidential data. Carefully designed statistical models
could produce high utility, low risks public microdata. Multiple synthetic datasets
should be generated, and appropriate combining rules have been developed to provide
accurate point estimates and variance estimates of parameters of interest. Refer to
Reiter and Raghunathan (2007); Drechsler (2011b) for details of the combining rules.
Synthetic data comes in two flavors, i) partially synthetic, where only sensitive
attributes of all or some of the records are synthesized (Little, 1993), and ii) fully
synthetic, where all attributes of every record are synthesized (Rubin, 1993). Since
their proposals, a great number of research has been done on developing synthesizers,
evaluating the utility and risks of the synthetic data. Refer to Drechsler (2011b) for
a comprehensive review of partially and fully synthetic data and their applications.
It is worth noting that the U. S. Census Bureau has been involved in providing
access to microdata through synthetic data products. Examples of their synthetic
data products include i) OnTheMap (based on Machanavajjhala et al. (2008)), ii)
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the synthetic Longitudinal Business Database - SynLBD (based on Kinney et al.
(2011, 2014)), iii) synthetic Survey of Income and Program Participation - SIPP
Synthetic Beta (based on Benedetto et al. (2013)), among others. Germany also has
implemented synthetic versions of their German IAB Establishment Panel (based on
Drechsler et al. (2008a,b)). More and more statistical agencies have started experi-
menting with synthetic data to for their microdata releases.
Among the published work on synthetic data, many focus on developing synthe-
sizers and proposing utility measures (both the global utility measures (Karr et al.,
2006) for synthetic data in general, and outcome specific utility measures for the
particular application). The risk measures, while important, have been paid less at-
tention to overall. This is understandable for at least three reasons: i) for the attribute
disclosure risks (i.e. measuring the probability of an intruder correctly guessing the
original values of the synthesized attributes of a respondent), which exists both in
partially synthetic data and fully synthetic data, the principled evaluation procedure
came out only recently and is not a straightforward procedure to implement; ii) for the
identification disclosure risks (i.e. measuring the probability of correctly identifying
a respondent by matching with available information from elsewhere), which usually
only exist in partially synthetic data, the evaluation procedure can be followed in a
straightforward manner, encouraging no further development of the measures them-
selves; and iii) unlike utility measures, which can vary a lot in different applications,
risk measures evaluation procedure largely depends on the type of risk measure.
In this paper, we want to present easy-to-follow construction of some Bayesian
estimation methods for evaluating attribute disclosure risks and identification disclo-
sure risks. These methods use Bayesian thinking in computing probabilities, which
are generally natural and easy to understand. Bayesian probabilities are subjective
and Bayesian methods are useful for modeling the beliefs of data intruders. Moreover
in the estimation process, different assumptions of intruder’s knowledge and behavior
can be incorporated at various stages. While flexible and intuitive, the actual im-
plementation of the Bayesian estimation process can be complicated and difficult to
execute. Therefore, we aim at highlighting key steps in the estimation process, and
complementing with real applications with a focus on the risk evaluation aspect of
each application. The readers will also see exciting synthetic data projects for vari-
ous types of data and protection purposes, and the application-specific disclosure risk
measures being considered in each application. Discussion of challenges and future
directions are throughout the paper as well as at the end as a summary.
The remainder of paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we give an overview
of risk evaluation for synthetic data and lay out the two types of disclosure risks
we consider, namely the attribute disclosure risks and identification disclosure risks.
Section 3 presents the Bayesian estimation methods of attribute disclosure risks, from
notations and step, to key estimating steps, then selected examples, and finally dis-
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cussion and comments. Section 4 follows a similar structure, where we present the
Bayesian estimation methods of identification disclosure risks. Finally in Section 5,
we give a summary.
2 Overview of synthetic data risks evaluation
This paper considers two types of disclosure risks: i) attribute disclosure risks (i.e.
the intruder correctly inferring the original values of the synthesized attributes), and
ii) identification disclosure risks (i.e. the intruder correctly identifying a respondent
in the sample by matching with other available information). Depending on the
synthetic flavor (partially versus fully), one or both of these two types of disclosure
risks potentially exist. In this section, we briefly discuss why for partially synthetic
data, both attribute disclosure and identification disclosure risks potentially exist,
whereas for fully synthetic data, only attribute disclosure risks are considered and
evaluated.
We note that these two types of disclosure risks are generic, i.e. for any syn-
thetic data product, one or both types should be considered and evaluated. At-
tribute disclosure risks in particular, come in various forms depending on the na-
ture of the synthesized attributes and the purposes of the privacy protection. For
some applications, such as Hu et al. (2014) where fully synthetic individual records
were generated, the attribute disclosure risks are in the form of guessing correctly
of the attributes of a record. In other applications, for example when generating
synthetic geolocation applications, researchers had created attribute disclosure risk
measures based on distance between synthesized geolocations and actual geolocations
(Wang and Reiter, 2012; Paiva et al., 2014; Quick et al., 2015, 2018). Moreover, for
synthetic business establishment data applications, researchers had created attribute
disclosure risk measures based on percentages of closest match and their variations
(Domingo-Ferrer et al., 2001; Kim et al., 2015), and other measures based on rela-
tive difference between the true largest value and the intruder’s estimate (Kim et al.,
2018). We note that not all of these application-specific disclosure risk measures
undergo similar estimation procedures as the ones we present in this paper.
2.1 Disclosure risks of releasing partially synthetic data
In partially synthetic data, only sensitive attributes of all or some of the records are
synthesized and some other attributes are left un-synthesized. When some of the un-
synthesized attributes are available to the intruder via external databases, a matching
mechanism based on the common available attributes may allow the intruder to iden-
tify records in the released dataset, thus resulting in identification disclosure risks.
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For example, suppose a partially synthetic dataset contains 1000 individual records
and 6 attributes. Among them, 3 are synthesized sensitive attributes {age, date of
birth, annual income} and 3 are un-synthesized attributes {gender, marital status,
county}. Suppose now an intruder knows that person X is in the sample, and the
intruder also knows the gender and the county of person X . Since both gender and
county are un-synthesized, the intruder will have a reasonable chance of identifying
person X in the sample. Such disclosure risks are identification disclosure.
In addition to potential identification disclosure risks, attribute disclosure risks
exist in partially synthetic data. We can easily imagine an intruder trying to infer
the true values of the synthesized attributes given the released synthetic data, the un-
synthesized attributes and other information. The availability of the un-synthesized
attributes may greatly increase the chance of accurate inference of the synthesized
attributes. Continuing the example of person X from earlier, with a possible identi-
fication, the intruder can now move to find out the original values of the synthesized
age, date of birth and annual income of person X . Such disclosure risks are attribute
disclosure.
2.2 Disclosure risks of releasing fully synthetic data
Several authors had claimed that in fully synthetic data, identification disclosure risks
are not applicable since there is no unique mapping of the records in the synthetic
data to the records in the original data (Hu et al., 2014; Wei and Reiter, 2016). This
is generally true because all attributes of all records are synthesized in fully synthetic
data.
Although identification disclosure risks are treated as non-existing in fully syn-
thetic data, attribute disclosure risks potentially exist, as an intruder can try to use
the released synthetic data and any other information to infer an entire records. For
example, suppose a fully synthetic dataset contains 1000 individual records and 6
attributes, {age, date of birth, annual income, gender, marital status, county}, of
which all are synthesized. Suppose that person X is in the published synthetic data
and the intruder knows this information. In addition, the intruder knows the real
attribute values of the other 999 individuals, then the intruder might be able to find
out the attributes of person X with a reasonable chance. Such disclosure risks are
attribute disclosure.
2.3 Disclosure probabilities and their summaries
The Bayesian estimation methods we present in this paper focus on calculating the
probabilities of attribute disclosure and identification disclosure. For example, for
attribute disclosure risks, we present how to estimate the probability of guessing the
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original values of the synthesized vector of attributes Ysi of record i to be y
∗ given
the synthetic data, the un-synthesized attributes, and any other information. This
estimated probability is for record i specifically, which is at the record level.
In addition, synthetic data disseminators can provide file-level summaries of these
record-level probabilities. These file-level summaries can be different depending on
the applications. For example, when synthesizing fully categorical data as in Hu et al.
(2014, 2018) in Section 3.3.1, ranks and re-normalized probabilities are reported as
file-level summaries because of the nature of the synthesis (fully) and the nature of
the attributes (all categorical). When synthesizing partially continuous data as in
Wang and Reiter (2012) in Section 3.3.2, Euclidean distances between the intruder’s
guess of the longitude and latitude and the actual longitude and latitude, and sub-
sequent counts within a radius are reported as file-level summaries because of the
nature of the synthesis (partially) and the nature of the attributes (continuous, in
particular, the longitude and latitude of a record).
For attribute disclosure, we focus on calculating the record-level disclosure proba-
bilities in the key estimating steps (Section 3.2). Then in the application section (Sec-
tions 3.3), we present file-level disclosure probability summaries for each application,
though we touch on the record-level disclosure probabilities calculation assumptions
briefly. For identification disclosure, a standard set of 3 file-level summaries is re-
ported in all selected examples. Therefore, we present both the methods to calculate
the record-level disclosure probabilities and the methods to calculate the file-level
disclosure probability summaries in the key estimating steps (Section 4.2). We want
to make the readers aware of the distinction between the record-level probabilities
and file-level summaries of disclosure risks.
3 Bayesian estimation of attribute disclosure risks
As discussed previously with the examples in Section 2.1 and Section 2.2, attribute
disclosure risks potentially exist for fully synthetic data and partially synthetic data.
Evaluating the attribute disclosure risks in fully synthetic data had been a seem-
ingly impossible task for a while. Empirical matching or misclassification-based ap-
proaches (Shlomo and Skinner, 2010) cannot be used since there is no correspondence
between the original and the synthetic datasets. Skinner (2012) called for further re-
search on the existing Bayesian approaches to disclosure risk assessment, especially to
emphasize the Bayesian thinking rather than simply using the Bayesian machinery in
the assessment process. As a response to the call of Skinner (2012), Reiter (2012) tried
to propose principled Bayesian estimation procedure for attribute disclosure risks for
fully synthetic data. The general framework laid out in Reiter (2012) was extended
by and further developed by Reiter et al. (2014) for both fully and partially synthetic
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data. This general framework gives interpretable probability statements of the at-
tribute disclosure risks, and provides flexible incorporation of different assumptions
of intruder’s knowledge and behavior.
In this section, we present the framework of Reiter et al. (2014) for Bayesian es-
timation of attribute disclosure risks. We use similar notations, highlight the key
steps, and illustrate with selected examples. We have chosen these examples that
are built upon the framework but tailored for specific purposes and needs of the ap-
plications. To be as comprehensive as possible, we focus on the following: i) fully
synthetic categorical data (Hu et al., 2014, 2018), ii) partially synthetic continuous
data (Wang and Reiter, 2012), and iii) fully synthetic count data (Wei and Reiter,
2016). In the end, we will discuss the challenges and future directions of this frame-
work.
3.1 Notations and setup
Let yi = (yi1, · · · , yip) be the vector response of observation i in the original confi-
dential dataset, where direct identifiers (such as name or SSN) are removed. When
needed, we use j as the variable index, and j = 1, · · · , p. Among the p variables,
i) some are synthesized, denoted by ysi ; and ii) others are un-synthesized, denoted
by yusi . We have yi = (y
s
i ,y
us
i ) for the i-th observation with its original values, and
y = (ys,yus) for the entire dataset containing n observations with their original val-
ues. We note that when fully synthesis is carried out, yus = Ø, therefore y = ys.
Without loss of generality, we use y = (ys,yus) when introducing the notations, setup
and key estimating steps.
On the agency side, m > 1 synthetic datasets are released, denoted by Z. Each
synthetic dataset is denoted by Z(l) where l = 1, · · · , m. See Drechsler (2011b) for
review of synthetic data and the references therein.
On the intruder side, suppose the intruder intends to learn the original value of ysi
for some record i in y. Several pieces of information can be available to the intruder:
i) yus = {yusi : i = 1, · · · , n}, the un-synthesized values of all n observations; ii)
A, any auxiliary information known by the intruder about records in y; and iii) S
denotes any information known by the intruder about the process of generating Z.
We will discuss each piece in detail in Section 3.2.
Let Ysi be the random variable representing the intruder’s uncertain knowledge
of ysi . The intruder seeks the distribution of p(Y
s
i | Z,y
us, A, S). If Ysi is a vector of
categorical variables, then probabilities of accurately inferring the confidential values
can be calculated through p(Ysi = y
∗ | Z, A, S), where y∗ is one plausible combination
of categorical responses of those variables. The examples (Hu et al., 2014, 2018) in
Section 3.3.1 on fully synthetic categorical data are illustrations for Ysi being a vector
of categorial variables. IfYsi is one or multiple continuous or count variables, context-
7
specific file-level attribute disclosure probability summaries should be developed to
summarize the attribute disclosure risks. The examples of Wang and Reiter (2012)
on partial synthetic continuous data in Section 3.3.2, and Wei and Reiter (2016) on
fully synthetic count data in Section 3.3.3 provide illustrations for these types of Ysi .
For the agency, it is paramount to model different intruder’s knowledge and be-
havior, i.e. assumptions on the level of knowledge of yus, A, and S. The framework
in Reiter et al. (2014) allows the incorporation of these different assumptions at mul-
tiple stages in the estimating process, thus gives extensive flexibility to parties trying
to evaluate attribute disclosure risks.
3.2 Key estimating steps
The intruder seeks the distribution of p(Ysi = y
∗ | Z,yus, A, S), where y∗ is one
possible guess of Ysi by the intruder. Recall that y
us, A, and S are available to the
intruder. According to Bayes rule,
p(Ysi = y
∗ | Z,yus, A, S) ∝ p(Z | Ysi = y
∗,yus, A, S)p(Ysi = y
∗ | yus, A, S), (1)
where p(Z | Ysi = y
∗,yus, A, S) is the synthetic data distribution given what the
intruder knows, and p(Ysi = y
∗ | yus, A, S) represents the intruder’s prior on Ysi = y
∗
given yus, A, and S.
The estimation procedure of Equation (1) varies by the variable type of Ysi , and
assumptions on the level of knowledge of yus, A, and S, among other things. Here we
go through each of these quantities and their implications in the estimating process,
highlight several common practices that have been adopted, before we illustrate with
a selection of attribute disclosure risk assessment demonstrations with real synthetic
data applications in Section 3.3.
3.2.1 Knowledge of yus
Recall yus = {yusi : i = 1, · · · , n} is the set of un-synthesized values of all n observa-
tions. As mentioned before, when Z is partially synthetic, since intruder has access
to Z, yus can be determined and thus available. When Z is fully synthetic, yus = Ø,
therefore we can drop this term and further simplify the expression for fully synthetic
Z as
p(Ysi = y
∗ | Z, A, S) ∝ p(Z | Ysi = y
∗, A, S)p(Ysi = y
∗ | A, S). (2)
Often times Ysi is further simplified to Yi, as in Hu et al. (2014, 2018). However,
without loss of generality, we keep yus in the following discussion. Readers should
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keep in mind that with fully synthetic data, yus = Ø; while with partially synthetic
data, yus is available.
3.2.2 Assumptions about A
We use A to denote auxiliary information known by the intruder about records in y.
As yus is either known in partial synthetic or dropped in fully synthetic, A specifically
refers to information about ys, the synthesized values. When the intruder seeks
p(Ysi = y
∗ | Z,yus, A, S), the distribution of record i’s synthesized variables, there are
numerous possible scenarios of what the intruder knows about the synthesized values
of every other record, denoted by the matrix ys
−i. First proposed in (Reiter, 2012), a
“worst case” scenario where the intruder knows the original values of the synthesized
variables of all records except for record i has been a common practice, i.e. A = ys
−i.
This practice has been recognized as strong intruder knowledge and conservative, as in
many contexts, it is impossible for the intruder to know ys
−i. However, it has also been
argued that if disclosure risks under such conservative assumption are acceptable,
disclosure risks should be acceptable for weaker A (Reiter, 2012; Reiter et al., 2014).
As Reiter (2012); Hu et al. (2014) noted, assuming the intruder knows all records but
one is related to, but quite distinct from, the assumptions used in differential privacy
(Dwork, 2006). McClure and Reiter (2012) designed simulation studies to compare
the two paradigms.
3.2.3 Assumptions about S
S denotes any information known by the intruder about the process of generating Z.
Examples include code for the synthesizer and descriptions of the synthesis model.
Such information sometimes can be public available with great details. For example,
the Census Bureau’s Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) Synthetic
Beta product has an accompanying document Benedetto et al. (2013) describing their
synthesizing process. From the document, we gather that they implemented a Se-
quential Regression Multivariate Imputation (SRMI) framework, with three main
models (linear regression, logistic regression, and Bayesian bootstrap (Rubin, 1981))
for missing data imputation and synthetic data generation. Such public available
detailed information should be assumed known by the intruder.
3.2.4 Choosing the prior p(Ysi = y
∗ | yus, A, S)
Determining the intruder’s prior beliefs of p(Ysi = y
∗ | yus, A, S) is another nearly
impossible task. Skinner (2012) challenged the use of prior distributions being a
more technical one for the Bayesian machinery to function, and advocated for prior
distributions that should be defensible from the agency’s perspective. A common
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practice is to specify uniform prior distributions of Ysi = y
∗ for all possible guesses
y∗, given (yus, A, S) as proposed in Reiter (2012), but also consider a variety of
prior distributions when possible, especially if more informative prior is available
Wei and Reiter (2016).
3.2.5 The estimation of p(Z | Ysi = y
∗,yus, A, S)
We now go through the estimation of p(Z | Ysi = y
∗,yus, A, S). The previously dis-
cussed assumptions of A and S are relevant in this part of the estimating process. The
importance sampling techniques coupled with Monte Carlo simulation are adopted
common practices, and we will present and discuss why and how they work.
Typically by the independence ofm different synthetic datasets, we work with each
synthetic dataset Z(l) separately, therefore we consider p(Z(l) | Y
s
i = y
∗,yus, A, S) for
our discussion. To ultimately obtain p(Z | Ysi = y
∗,yus, A, S), we have
p(Z | Ysi = y
∗,yus, A, S) =
m∏
l=1
p(Z(l) | Y
s
i = y
∗,yus, A, S). (3)
For p(Z(l) | Y
s
i = y
∗,yus, A, S), under the “worst case” scenario where the intruder
knows the original values of the synthesized variables of all reords except for record
i, i.e. A = ys
−i, we come to
p(Z(l) | Y
s
i = y
∗,yus, A = ys
−i, S), (4)
which is very close to the distribution from which the synthetic data Z(l) is generated,
as in
p(Z(l) | y, S) = p(Z(l) | Y
s
i = yi,y
us, A = ys
−i, S), (5)
where yi is the true record in the original confidential dataset y. As we can see,
the only difference in the conditioned quantities in Equation (4) and Equation (5) is
difference between y∗ (the random guess) and yi (the true record).
In fact, we could utilize the small difference between y and (Ysi = y
∗,yus, A =
ys
−i, S) for estimating p(Z(l) | Y
s
i = y
∗,yus, A = ys
−i, S). If we use Θ to denote the
parameters in the synthesis model M , we could easily incorporate Θ draws in our
estimation of p(Z(l) | Y
s
i = y
∗,yus, A = ys
−i, S) through a Monte Carlo step, as in
p(Z(l) | Y
s
i = y
∗,yus, A = ys
−i, S) =
∫
p(Z(l) | Y
s
i = y
∗,yus, A = ys
−i, S,Θ)
p(Θ | Ysi = y
∗,yus, A = ys
−i, S)dΘ. (6)
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The Monte Carlo step requires re-estimation of the synthesis model M for each
Ysi = y
∗, which could be computationally prohibitive if many possible guesses of
Ysi need to be evaluated. To avoid the re-estimation of M to draw Θ samples,
a common procedure via importance sampling is adopted. In particular, available
draws of Θ from p(Θ | y), the model used for generating the synthetic dataset Z(l),
act as proposals for the importance sampling algorithm. Readers are referred to
Paiva et al. (2014); Hu et al. (2014) for a review of importance sampling and its
usage in the applications therein.
3.3 Selected examples
In this selected examples section, we want to show the readers in a few different
applications, i) what are ys, yus, Ysi , A, and S; ii) what are the risk scenarios (i.e.
assumptions are made for A and S), and their implications; and iii) what are the
specific file-level attribute disclosure probability summaries in each application. For
each application, we give a brief overview of the dataset(s) and research questions
to provide the background. We also mention the synthesizers, but the details of
the synthesizers and the evaluation of the utility of the synthetic data are omitted,
as we focus on the estimation of probabilities of attribute disclosure in this paper.
Interested readers should refer to the cited papers for further information.
3.3.1 Fully synthetic categorical data
Hu et al. (2014) aimed at generating fully synthetic categorical data for a subset of
n = 10000 individuals from the 2012 American Community Survey (ACS) public use
microdata sample for the state of North Carolina. They considered 14 unordered
categorical variables, as listed in Table 1. We include the variables, the number of
categories of each variable, and whether a variable is synthesized in this table.
While the authors attempted fully synthetic data generation (Rubin, 1993), they
followed the partially synthetic approach (Little, 1993) to replace all values in the
data by synthetic values (Drechsler, 2011a). Unlike the approach of Rubin (1993),
where no correspondence between a fully synthetic record and a real world record with
subscript i, their approach maintains such correspondence, which is a key assumption
in their proposed attribute disclosure evaluation methods. For more discussion on the
two approaches to generating fully synthetic data, refer to Drechsler (2018).
The authors used Dirichlet Process mixture of products of multinomial (DPMPM)
synthesizer. The DPMPM is consisted of a set of flexible Bayesian latent class models
that have been developed to capture complex relationships among multivariate un-
ordered categorical variables (Dunson and Xing, 2009). In recent years, the DPMPM
has been proposed as a multiple imputation engine for missing data problems, and
11
Table 1: Variables used in the Hu et al. (2014). Data taken from the 2012 ACS public
use microdata samples.
Variable Number of categories Synthesized
Sex 2 Yes
Age 4 Yes
Race 6 Yes
Education level 4 Yes
Marital status 5 Yes
Language 2 Yes
Birth place 7 Yes
Military 3 Yes
Work 3 Yes
Disability 2 Yes
Health insurance coverage 2 Yes
Migration 3 Yes
School 3 Yes
Hispanic 2 Yes
a synthesizer for statistical disclosure control. Si and Reiter (2013) implemented the
DPMPM as an missing data imputation engine and demonstrated its superior per-
formance comparing to traditional sequential imputation models such as the mul-
tiple imputation with chained equations (MICE; Buuren and Groothuis-Oudshoorn
(2011)). In addition to Hu et al. (2014), Drechsler and Hu (2018+); Hu and Savitsky
(2018+) used the DPMPM synthesizer for generating partially synthetic data with
geocoding information. Variations of the DPMPM include versions of it dealing with
structural zeros (Manrique-Vallier and Reiter, 2014; Manrique-Vallier and Hu, 2018),
dealing with extension of the multinomial synthesizer (Hu and Hoshino, 2018), and
dealing with individuals nested within households (Hu et al., 2018; Akande et al.,
2018+b,+).
The DPMPM synthesizer assigns an underlying latent class of each record. Con-
ditioning on the latent class assignment, each attribute independently follows its own
distribution. For unordered categorical variable, such distribution is usually multi-
nomial distribution. To generate the synthetic vector of attributes of one record, we
first sample the latent class assignment. For each attribute, we generate the value
from its independent multinomial distribution with probabilities sampled from the
DPMPM.
We use Yi to represent the random attribute vector of record i (the upper script
s is dropped because this is fully synthetic, i.e. yusi = Ø and Y
s
i = Yi), Y to
represent the random attribute vectors of all n records, Z(l) to represent each fully
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synthetic dataset, where l = 1, · · · , m, and Z = {Z(1), · · · ,Z(m)} to represent all m
fully synthetic datasets.
Following the general setup and notations introduced earlier, we use A to repre-
sent the intruder’s information on person’s attributes in the sample (i.e. auxiliary
information), and S to represent any meta-data released by the agency about the
synthesis model. The goal is to estimate Ysi for one or more target records in the
sample. Specifically in this case, because all attributes are unordered categorical, we
are able enumerate all possible combinations of the categorical attributes.
Then the expression of the probability of attribute disclosure of an entire record
i becomes Equation (7),
p(Yi = y
∗ | Z, A, S) ∝ p(Z | Yi = y
∗, A, S)p(Yi = y
∗ | A, S), (7)
where y∗ is a guess by the intruder.
Hu et al. (2014) set A = y−i, which corresponds to the “worse case” scenario
where the intruder knows the actual data for all records except for the record i.
p(Yi = y
∗ | Z, A = y−i, S) ∝ p(Z | Yi = y
∗, A = y−i, S)p(Yi = y
∗ | A = y−i, S).
(8)
To estimate p(Z | Yi = y
∗, A = y−i, S), the authors proposed to dramatically
reduce the set of possible combinations that y∗ could take. Specifically, they consider
the neighborhood near yi (the true record), which contains only feasible candidates
where y∗ differ from yi in one variable. In their illustrative application, the subset
contains only 35 combinations, reduced from 8709120 cells in the contingency table.
The authors commented that if risks of Yi being the true yi are acceptable in this
reduced set, then the risks would be even lower when considering the full set. The
risks in the reduced set are the upper bound. Importance sampling techniques were
applied to avoid re-evaluation of probability of obtaining the synthetic datasets Z
given different combinations of (Yi = y
∗, A = y−i, S), as in Equation (4).
For the prior on p(Yi = y
∗ | A = y−i, S), Hu et al. (2014) assumed a uniform
prior, which sums to 1 over the number of combinations in the reduced set (e.g. 1/35
in their illustration). The prior probabilities were canceled out in the computation
process.
To summarize the calculated risks of attribute disclosure of all records, Hu et al.
(2014) created two file-level attribute disclosure probability summaries:
(i) The ranking of the probability of the true record being disclosed, among the
subset of combinations;
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(ii) The re-normalized probability of the true record being disclosed, among the
subset of combinations.
In general, the higher the ranking and the re-normalized probability, the higher the
attribute disclosure risks.
Additionally, Hu et al. (2014) investigated scenarios where the intruder might
know a subset of values in yi, for example, demographic variables. The authors then
defined each yi as yi = (yi,k,yi,uk), where the additional subscript k denotes the vari-
ables known by the intruder and uk denotes the variables unknown by the intruder.
Subsequently, to evaluate risks for intruders seeking to estimate the distribution of
Yi,uk, the authors defined A = (yi,yi,k), and Equation (8) becomes
p(Yi,uk = y
∗
uk | Z, A = (yi,yi,k), S) ∝ p(Z | Yi,uk = y
∗
uk, A = (yi,yi,k), S)
p(Yi,uk = y
∗
uk | A = (yi,yi,k), S). (9)
The estimation procedure works in a similar way, and we refer interested readers
to Hu et al. (2014) for detail and discussion.
3.3.2 Partially synthetic continuous data
Wang and Reiter (2012) aimed at generating partially synthetic data for sharing pre-
cise geographies. The precise geographies were exact longitude and latitude of each
death of a sample of n = 2670 North Carolina mortality records in 2002. Only exact
longitude and latitude of each record were synthesized, and all non-geographic vari-
ables were kept unchanged. We include the variables, their descriptions, and whether
a variable is synthesized in Table (2).
The authors used classification and regression trees (CART; refer to Reiter (2005b)
for details of using CART to generate partially synthetic data) synthesizers for gen-
erating longitudes and latitudes. In particular, they first fit a regression tree of longi-
tudes on all non-geographic attributes, and generated synthetic longitudes using the
Bayesian bootstrap. After obtaining synthetic longitudes, they fit another regression
tree of latitude on all non-geographic attributes and the true latitude, and generated
synthetic latitudes using the Bayesian bootstrap. In the end, the partially synthetic
precise geographies were simulated.
We use Ysi to represent the random longitude and latitude of record i, Y
s to
represent the random longitudes and latitudes of all n records, yus to represent the
un-synthesized value of all n records, Z(l) to represent each partially synthetic dataset,
where l = 1, · · · , m, and Z = {Z(1), · · · ,Z(m)} to represent all m partially synthetic
datasets.
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Table 2: Variables used in the Wang and Reiter (2012). Data taken from the 2012
North Carolina mortality records dataset.
Variable Description Synthesized
Longitude Recoded (1 - 100) Yes
Latitude Recoded (1 - 100) Yes
Sex Male, female No
Race White, black No
Age (years) 16-99 No
Autopsy performed Yes, no, missing No
Autopsy findings Yes, no, missing No
Marital status 5 categories No
Attendant 3 categories No
Hispanic 7 categories No
Education (years) 0-17 No
Hospital type 8 categories No
Cause of death Binary No
Following the general setup and notations introduced earlier, we use A to repre-
sent the intruder’s information on person’s attributes in the sample (i.e. auxiliary
information), and S to represent any meta-data released by the agency about the
synthesis model. The goal is to estimate Ysi for one or more target records in the
sample. We now express the probability of attribute disclosure of estimating the lon-
gitude and latitude of record i, which is the same as in Equation (1) and restated
below in Equation (10). Recall that y∗ is a possible original value of Ysi by the
intruder.
p(Ysi = y
∗ | Z,yus, A, S) ∝ p(Z | Ysi = y
∗,yus, A, S)p(Ysi = y
∗ | yus, A, S)(10)
Wang and Reiter (2012) evaluated two scenarios regarding the choice of A and S.
(i) Scenario #1 (high-risk): The intruder knows everything except for one target’s
Ysi , i.e., A = y
s
−i, and S includes everything about the CART except the
individual geographies in the nodes. Note that A = ys
−i is the same as the
“worst case” scenario discussed in Section 3.2.
p(Ysi = y
∗ | Z,yus, A = ys
−i, S) ∝ p(Z | Y
s
i = y
∗,yus, A = ys
−i, S)
p(Ysi = y
∗ | yus, A = ys
−i, S)
(11)
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(ii) Scenario #2 (low-risk): The intruder does not know any records’ geographies,
i.e., A = Ø, and S includes everything about the CART except the individual
geographies in the nodes.
p(Ysi = y
∗ | Z,yus, A = Ø, S) ∝ p(Z | Ysi = y
∗,yus, A = Ø, S)
p(Ysi = y
∗ | yus, A = Ø, S)
(12)
For the high-risk scenario, to estimate p(Z | Ysi = y
∗,yus, A = ys
−i, S), importance
sampling techniques were applied to avoid re-evaluation of probability of obtaining the
synthetic datasets Z given different combinations of (Ysi = y
∗,yus, A, S), as in Equa-
tion (4). For the intruder’s prior on p(Ysi = y
∗ | yus, A = ys
−i, S), Wang and Reiter
(2012) assumed a uniform distribution on a grid over a small area containing the
target’s true longitude and latitude.
The authors noted that the uniform prior for p(Ysi = y
∗ | yus, A = ys
−i, S)
represents strong intruder prior information, because the prior was given on a grid
over a small area. They also noted that the value of the risk measure would change if
other prior specifications were given, though they did not consider other specifications
in their attribute risk disclosure evaluation.
Specifically, Wang and Reiter (2012) developed two geographies-specific attribute
disclosure risk measures:
(i) A Euclidean distance R1 between the intruder’s guess of the longitude and
latitude and the actual longitude and latitude;
(ii) The count R2 recording the number of actual cases in circle centered at the
actual longitude and latitude with radius R1.
In general, larger values of R1 and R2 correspond to smaller attribute disclosure
risks.
We also want to note that Paiva et al. (2014) used a similar dataset with the
goal of partially synthesizing geographies. Though their synthesis model was different
from the one in Wang and Reiter (2012), they proposed three other file-level attribute
disclosure probability summaries for synthetic data applications involving geographic
locations.
(i) A file-level risk measure of the percentage of records with the true location yi
being the maximum posterior probability of record i;
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(ii) A file-level risk measure of the percentage of records with the true location yi
being the maximum posterior probability of record i, and record i has unique
patterns;
(iii) A Euclidean distance measure between the true location yi and the guess y
∗
with the maximum posterior probability of record i.
In general, smaller values of measures (i) and (ii) and larger values of measure
(iii) correspond to smaller attribute disclosure risks.
3.3.3 Fully synthetic continuous data
Wei and Reiter (2016) aimed at generating fully synthetic data for sharing magnitude
microdata from business establishments. The magnitude variables were the number of
skilled laborers, the number of unskilled laborers, wages of skilled laborers, and wages
of unskilled laborers of a sample of n = 1051 food manufacturing establishments in
the country of Colombia in 1977. All 4 magnitude variables were synthesized, making
it a fully synthetic microdata endeavor. We include the variables, their descriptions,
and whether a variable is synthesized in Table (3).
Table 3: Variables used in the Wei and Reiter (2016). Data taken from the 1977
Colombia food manufacturing establishments sample.
Variable Description Synthesized
Number of skilled laborers Integer Yes
Number of unskilled laborers Integer Yes
Wages of skilled laborers Integer Yes
Wages of unskilled laborers Integer Yes
The authors used three synthesizers based on finite mixtures of Poisson (MP) dis-
tributions. The class of finite mixtures of Poissons can i) capture complex multivariate
associations among the variables; and ii) model count variables. In addition to the
basic MP synthesizer, Wei and Reiter (2016) proposed the mixture of Multinomial
(MM) synthesizer, which ensures the synthetic values sum to marginal totals in the
confidential data. The marginal totals constraints are satisfied by performing another
layer of Multinomial draws of counts within each occupied Poisson mixture compo-
nent. Specifically, the totals (e.g. the number of skilled laborers) and the number of
cases (in running the MP, at each MCMC iteration, each records is assigned to a com-
ponent) in each occupied Poisson mixture component are computed and stored. Based
on the totals and the number of cases, a Multinomial sample is generated, distributing
the totals into all levels. Within each occupied Poisson mixture, the marginal totals
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match in the synthetic and confidential data, therefore overall marginal totals also
match. Furthermore, the authors proposed the tail-collapsed mixture of Multinomial
(TCMM) synthesizer, which effectively performs a model-based variation of microag-
gregation plus noise, by collapsing tails of individual variables (i.e. risky values). For
TCMM, one needs to specify a parameter associated with the quantile, namely q,
which acts as a threshold to control the amount of collapsing.
We use Yi to represent the random vector of the numbers of skilled and unskilled
laborers and their corresponding wages of record i, Y to represent the these 4 random
magnitude variables of all n records, Z(l) to represent each fully synthetic dataset,
where l = 1, · · · , m, and Z = {Z(1), · · · ,Z(m)} to represent all m fully synthetic
datasets. Note that we dropped the upper script s in Ys and use Y and Yi directly
because every variable is synthesized.
Specific to the business establishment survey data, we need to define a few other
quantities before we can describe the risk scenarios and file-level attribute disclosure
probability summaries. We use y(1)j and y(2)j to represent the largest and second
largest values of variable j in y, the original confidential dataset. When the intruder
does not know these values, we use Y(1)j and Y(2)j as the random variables representing
the intruder’s uncertain knowledge about them. Furthermore, we let Tj be the total
of variable j in y, and use y(1) and y(2) to represent the values of two entire records.
Wei and Reiter (2016) considered a variety of risk scenarios. As an illustration
of evaluating attribute disclosure for fully synthetic continuous data, we present the
scenario where the intruder, who has the second largest value of a certain variable,
y(2)j , attempts to use the released synthetic data Z to learn about the individual with
the largest value of the variable, the random quantity Y(1)j . Such scenario is commonly
used by official statistics agencies with business establishment data (Kim et al., 2015,
2018).
Recall that we use A to represent the intruder’s information on person’s attributes
in the sample (i.e. auxiliary information), and S to represent any meta-data released
by the agency about the synthesis model. Translating the scenario above into choices
of A and S, we come to Equation (13), which represents the attribute disclosure risk
probability of guessing Y(1)j = y
∗
(1)j when Tj is available.
Pr(Y(1)j = y
∗
(1)j | Z,y(2), Y(1)j ≥ y(2)j , Tj) ∝ Pr(Z | Y(1)j = y
∗
(1)j ,y(2), Tj)
Pr(Y(1)j = y
∗
(1)j | y(2), Y(1)j ≥ y(2)j , Tj),
(13)
where y∗(1)j is a possible original value of Y(1)j by the intruder.
To estimate Pr(Z | Y(1)j = y
∗
(1)j ,y(2), Tj), techniques of using Z to approximate
the set of records in the same component occupied by the target record were applied
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to simplify the computation. We refer the readers to Wei and Reiter (2016) for the
details regarding the MM and TCMM synthesizers.
For the intruder’s prior on Pr(Y(1)j = y
∗
(1)j | y(2), Y(1)j ≥ y(2)j , Tj), Wei and Reiter
(2016) discussed the choice of a non-uniform prior distribution, which could provide
more accurate prior guesses and is worth noting here. In their empirical illustration of
synthesizing fully magnitude data from the Colombia food manufacturing establish-
ments dataset, the authors estimated the chance that the largest value of the number
of skilled laborers falls into an interval, with the lower bound being the second largest
value and the upper bound being pre-defined. Among the three different synthesizers,
the attribute disclosure risks under the MP and the MM synthesizers are extremely
high, whereas the risks under the TCMM synthesizer are overall much lower. Further-
more, the risks decrease as the threshold parameter q decreases, which are expected
because of the amount of tail collapsing increases as q decreases. Interested readers
are encouraged to consult Wei and Reiter (2016) for their explanations.
We also want to point out that Wei and Reiter (2016) evaluated two other sets of
scenarios, both of which assume the intruder seeks to guess the values of variable j
of two records, y(1)j and y(2)j . The first set of scenario is the intruder knows all but
one or two values in y, which means the intruder seeks to estimate the probability
of (Y(1)j = y
∗
(1)j , Y(2)j = y
∗
(2)j) given Z, Y(1)j + Y(2)j = T2j and different combinations
of A and S. The second set of scenario is the intruder knows all data values except
for one or two records, which means the intruder seeks to estimate the probability of
(Y(1)j = y
∗
(1)j , Y(2)j = y
∗
(2)j) given Z, Y(1) +Y(2) = T2 and different combinations of A
and S.
3.4 Discussion and comments
There are few common practices for evaluating attribute disclosure risks in the se-
lected examples, as well as in other synthetic applications. The first one is on the
assumptions about A, the auxiliary information known by the intruder about records
in ys. The “worse case” scenario of letting A = ys
−i, i.e. the intruder knows all
the original values of the synthesized variables of all records except for record i,
though provides an upper bound of the identification risks, is a very strong and
probably unrealistic assumption. The scenario greatly simplifies the estimation of
p(Z | Ysi = y
∗,yus, A, S) as in Section 3.2.5 and Equation (3), by setting A = ys
−i.
If the assumption is weaker, for example, the intruder only knows the synthesized
values of next record i+ 1, then A = ysi+1, which means the approximation in Equa-
tion (4) to (6) will involve extra steps of imputing all the other synthesized values
{ysi′ , i
′ 6= i, i′ 6= i + 1} (see Paiva et al. (2014) for a potential solution of approxima-
tion). Such weaker assumptions are much more realistic, but almost computationally
infeasible with the current setup. McClure and Reiter (2016) examined the effect on
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attribute disclosure risks in fully synthetic data by decreasing the number of observa-
tions knows (i.e. weakening the assumption of A = ys
−i). Future research in designing
faster algorithm to estimate p(Z | Ysi = y
∗,yus, A, S) with weaker A is desired.
The common practice of setting the prior p(Ysi = y
∗ | yus, A, S) as a uniform
distribution has been adopted in various applications. Because of the cancellation
in Bayes’ rule, using a uniform prior for p(Ysi = y
∗ | yus, A, S) essentially simplifies
the estimation, as we only need to estimate p(Z | Ysi = y
∗, A, S) in Equation (2).
We should recognize not only its convenience in computation, but also its constraint.
Using a uniform prior can be un-informative for some cases, but it might be strongly
informative in other cases, as in Wang and Reiter (2012), which might not be re-
alistic. Using a uniform prior can be realistic in some cases, but it might need to
adjusted to reflect more realistic prior belief. For example, it is possible to argue that
the 35 combinations in the reduced subset in Hu et al. (2014) should not really be
treated equally likely (i.e. a uniform prior). Rather, some combinations might be
more plausible than the others, thus carrying higher prior probability. The general
advice is to consider a wide range of prior distribution for p(Ysi = y
∗ | yus, A, S) if
possible. Also, do not choose uniform only for its simplicity. Choosing a more real-
istic prior distribution provides a more reasonable attribute disclosure risks measure
(Wei and Reiter, 2016).
When estimating p(Z | Ysi = y
∗,yus, A, S), importance sampling techniques are
widely used to avoid re-estimating the synthesis model M for each Ysi = y
∗. First
of all, we should recognize that if A is not as strong as A = ys
−i, even the im-
portance sampling techniques will not help much. See the discussion in the first
paragraph of this section. Second of all, typically the set of guesses of Ysi , {y
∗}, is
reduced to a much smaller set than the full set containing all possible combinations.
Even though the reduction provides an upper bound of the attribute disclosure risks
(Hu et al., 2014, 2018), it is really for computational feasibility that such reduction
is applied. Further research paths include faster algorithm to expand the small re-
duced set, and new algorithm to search for y∗ that gives high probability estimation
of p(Z | Ysi = y
∗,yus, A, S) in an efficient way, therefore enabling the data dissem-
inator to check against the actual truth ysi and determine its attribute disclosure
risks level. Third of all, to use the Monte Carlo approximation coupled with impor-
tance sampling techniques in Equation (6), draws of Θ are necessary, which means
the final synthetic data generation process involves parametric models. Among the
selected examples, Hu et al. (2014); Wei and Reiter (2016) had parametric models for
the outcome (multinomial and poisson, respectively). Even though Wang and Reiter
(2012) used non-parametric CART synthesizers, their ultimate synthetic data genera-
tion process involves Bayesian bootstrap sampling with mixture normal distributions.
It is unclear how to estimate the attribute disclosure risks for true non-parametric
synthesizers, which can be a fruitful research path.
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There are additional possible difficulties in implementing the Bayesian estimation
procedure of attribute disclosure risks evaluation. As noted in Manrique-Vallier and Hu
(2018), their proposed synthesizers for categorical variables with structural zeros had
serious stability issues with the estimation of p(Z | Ysi = y
∗,yus, A, S), as its values
varied by several thousands in the log-scale from one sample of Θ to another, result-
ing enormous mean-squared error. The authors then developed an indirect bootstrap
hypothesis testing framework to approximate the ranking of y∗ in the reduced set.
We refer the readers to Manrique-Vallier and Hu (2018) for details.
One final comment to make is the work of McClure and Reiter (2012), where
the authors compared the disclosure risk criterion of ǫ-differential privacy with a
criterion based on the attribute disclosure risk probabilities. The evaluation from
their simulation studies was that the two paradigms are not easily reconciled. More-
over, sometimes attribute disclosure risks can be small even when ǫ is large. The
authors proposed an alternative disclosure risk assessment approach, one integrates
both paradigms, though great computation challenges were foreseeable. Further re-
search on risk assessment integrating the two paradigms is desired.
4 Bayesian estimation of identification disclosure
risks
As discussed previously, we only consider identification disclosure risks for partially
synthetic data.
Researchers had worked on Bayesian probabilistic matching to estimate the proba-
bilities of identifications of sampled units. Duncan and Lambert (1986, 1989); Lambert
(1993) developed Bayesian approaches to i) model the behavior of intruders, and ii)
quantify sources of uncertainty about those estimated probabilities. Their work is
followed by Fienberg et al. (1997), who estimated probabilities of identification for
continuous microdata, which had undergone SDL techniques by adding random noise.
Observing the lack of illustrative applications on genuine data, Reiter (2005a) ex-
tended the Duncan-Lambert framework using data from the Current Population Sur-
vey (CPS). Common SDL techniques (recoding, topcoding, swapping, adding random
noise, and combinations of these techniques) were applied to genuine microdata in
their illustrations. They also considered different assumptions of intruders’ knowledge
and behavior and incorporated such information into the estimation of the identifi-
cation probabilities.
The step-by-step probability estimation procedure in Reiter (2005a) has been
standard practice for Bayesian probabilistic matching ever since, especially after the
synthetic data approach has gained its momentum. Reiter and Mitra (2009) in par-
ticular first set up the framework for the Bayesian probabilistic matching for partially
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synthetic data.
We now turn to the framework in Reiter and Mitra (2009) for identification disclo-
sure risks estimation for synthetic data, which was built on the more general frame-
work for identification disclosure risks estimation of common SDL techniques in Reiter
(2005a). We use similar notations, highlight the key steps, and illustrate with selected
examples. We have chosen these examples that are built upon the framework but tai-
lored for specific purposes and needs. To be as comprehensive as possible, we present
two partially synthetic categorical data applications i) Reiter and Mitra (2009), ii)
Drechsler and Hu (2018+), and iii) partially synthetic categorical and continuous data
(Drechsler and Reiter, 2010). In the end, we will discuss the challenges and future
directions of this framework.
4.1 Notations and setup
In the sample S of n units and p variables, the notation yij refers to the j-th variable
of the i-th unit, where i = 1, · · · , n and j = 0, 1, · · · , p. The column j = 0 contains
some unique identifiers (such as name or Social Security Number), which are never
released. Among the recorded variables, i) some are available to users from external
databases, denoted by yAi , and ii) others are unavailable to users except in the released
data, denoted by yUi . We therefore have the vector response of the i-th unit, yi =
(yi1, · · · , yip) = (y
A
i ,y
U
i ). We also have the matrix Y = (Y
A,YU) representing the
original values of all n units.
On the agency side, suppose it releases all n units of the sample S. Similar to the
split of yi, we have zi = (zi1, · · · , zip) = (z
A
i , z
U
i ). Among the available variables, we
further split them into i) zAsi the synthesized variables, and ii) z
Aus
i the un-synthesized
variables. We therefore have zi = (z
Aus
i , z
As
i , z
U
i ), and we let Z = (Z
Aus,ZAs ,ZU) be
the matrix of all released data. We also let YAs be all n units’ original values of
the synthesized variables. We note that in some cases, the agency might only release
r ≤ n units of the sample (Reiter, 2005a).
On the intruder side, let t be the vector of information that the intruder has. t
may or may not be in Z, but we assume t = yAi for some unit in the population.
This vector t only contains un-synthesized and synthesized variables (no unavailable
variables as in yi and zi), thus we have t = (t
Aus, tAs). The intruder’s goal is to match
record i in Z to the target when zi0 = t0. Additionally, two other pieces of information
can be available to the intruder. Let S represent the meta-data released about the
simulation models used to generate the synthetic data, and let R represent the meta-
data released about the reason why records were selected for synthesis. Either S or
R could be empty.
There are n released units in Z. Let I be the random variable that equals to i when
zi0 = t0 for i ∈ Z and equals n+1 when zi0 = t0 for some i /∈ Z. The intruder intends
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to calculate Pr(I = i | t,Z, S, R) for i = 1, · · · , n + 1. The intruder is particularly
interested in learning whether any of the calculated identification probabilities for
i = 1, · · · , n are large enough to declare an identification.
For the agency, it is paramount to model different intruder’s knowledge and be-
havior when estimating identification risks from releasing synthetic dataset. The
framework in Reiter and Mitra (2009) allows the incorporation of these different as-
sumptions at multiple stages in the estimating process, thus gives extensive flexibility
to parties trying to evaluate identification disclosure risks.
4.2 Key estimating steps
The intruder intends to calculate Pr(I = i | t,Z, S, R) = for i = 1, · · · , n+ 1. Based
on the split of Z = (ZAus,ZAs ,ZU), we re-write the probability as
Pr(I = i | t,ZAus,ZAs,ZU , S, R). (14)
In fact, the intruder does not know the actual values in YAs, all n units’ original
values of the synthesized variables. Therefore for the intruder, integrating over its
possible values when computing the match probabilities is necessary, as in
Pr(I = i | t,ZAus,ZAs ,ZU , S, R) =
∫
Pr(I = i | t,ZAus,ZAs,ZU , S, R,YAs)
Pr(YAs | t,ZAus,ZAs,ZU , S, R)dYAs. (15)
The estimation procedure of Equation (15) varies by the variable(s) in t (e.g.
whether in tAus or in tAs), the variable types, assumptions on the level of knowledge
of t being in Z or not, of S and R, among other things. Here we go through each
of these aspects/quantities and their implications in the estimating process, highlight
several common practices that have been adopted, before we illustrate with a selection
of identification disclosure risk assessment demonstration with real synthetic data
applications in Section 4.3.
4.2.1 The variable(s) in tAus
An immediate simplification of Pr(I = i | t,ZAus,ZAs ,ZU , S, R,YAs) in Equation
(15) is
Pr(I = i | t,ZAus,ZAs,ZU , S, R,YAs) = Pr(I = i | t,ZAus,YAs). (16)
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This is true because whenYAs is given, I = i and {ZAs ,ZU , S, R} are conditionally
independent. That is, the intruder would use (ZAus,YAs) without the synthetic data
ZAs , the unavailable variables ZU , S, or R to attempt re-identification. Equation (16)
will be used in Sections 4.2.2 and 4.2.3 as well.
Consider any variable k in tAus. Since it is an un-synthesized variable, for any
unit i in ZAus where the released value of zik 6= tk, Pr(I = i | t,Z
Aus,YAs) = 0.
4.2.2 The variable(s) in tAs
For categorical variables in the synthesized set tAs, the intruder matches directly
on ZAs . For numerical or continuous variables in tAs, while exact match could be
pursued, the nature of the numerical/continuous variables will result in zero proba-
bilities for most if not all of the records. Therefore, it is advisable to match numerical
components of ZAs within some acceptable distance (e.g. Euclidean or Mahalonobis)
from the corresponding tAs.
4.2.3 Whether t is in Z or not
The overall assumption we have is that the vector of information that the intruder
has, t = yAi for some unit in the population, but not necessarily in Z. When t = y
A
i
is in Z, then the quantity in Equation (16) for I = n + 1 is 0, i.e. Pr(I = n + 1 |
t,ZAus,YAs) = 0. This simplifies calculating Pr(I = i | t,ZAus,YAs) for i ≤ n. For
example,
Pr(I = i | t,ZAus,YAs) =
1
nt
, (17)
where nt is the number of units in (Z
Aus,YAs) with yAi consistent with t.
When t = yAi is not in Z, then Pr(I = n + 1 | t,Z
Aus,YAs) 6= 0. If we let Nt be
the number of units in the population that have (zAusi ,y
As
i ) consistent with t which
are also included in Z, then
{
Pr(I = i | t,ZAus,YAs) = 1
Nt
,
P r(I = n + 1 | t,ZAus,YAs) = Nt−nt
Nt
.
(18)
Determining Nt can be done from census totals, or to be estimated from available
sources. Reiter and Mitra (2009) discussed possible ways for estimation using survey
weights. Model-based approaches to estimating Nt can be applied too, for example
Elamir and Skinner (2006), among others. Additional approaches to accounting for
intruder uncertainty due to sampling were proposed in Drechsler and Reiter (2008).
It is important to recognize that setting Pr(I = n + 1 | t,ZAus,YAs) = 0 results
in conservative measures of identification disclosure risks.
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4.2.4 Assumptions about S and R
Previously, we let S represent the meta-data released about the simulation models
used to generate the synthetic data, and R represent the meta-data released about
the reason why records were selected for synthesis. We note that in practice, R is
usually dropped because reasons why records were selected for synthesis are difficult
to come by. However, S can be available in many cases. For example, in Section
3.2, information about the synthesis models of the SIPP Synthetic Beta is available
online (Benedetto et al., 2013), which should be assumed by the intruder. Not only
the SIPP, information about the synthesis process of the SynLBD is publicly available
in Kinney et al. (2011, 2014).
4.2.5 Estimating Pr(I = i | t,ZAus,ZAs,ZU , S, R) through Monte Carlo
This description follows the description given in Drechsler and Hu (2018+). The
construction in Equation (15) suggests a Monte Carlo approach to estimating each
Pr(I = i | t,Z, S) (note that Z is used in place of (ZAus ,ZAs,ZU); R is dropped,
assuming unavailable), and we re-write it as
Pr(I = i | t,Z, S) =
∫
Pr(I = i | t,Z, S,YAs)Pr(YAs | t,Z, S)dYAs. (19)
For the Monte Carlo approach, perform the following two-step process.
(i) Sample a value of YAs from Pr(YAs | t,Z, S), and let Ynew represent one set
of simulated values.
(ii) Compute Pr(I = i | t,Z, S,YAs = Ynew) using exact matching assuming Ynew
are collected values.
This two-step process is iterated h times, where ideally h is large, and Equation
(19) is estimated as
Pr(I = i | t,Z, S) ≈
1
h
∑
h
Pr(I = i | t,Z, S,YAs = Y(h)new), (20)
where YAs = Y
(h)
new indicates one iteration of the two-step process.
When S has no information, the intruder treats the simulated values as plausible
draws of YAs.
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4.2.6 Three summaries of identification disclosure probabilities
For attribute disclosure risk measures in Section 3.3, summaries of attribute disclo-
sure probabilities vary by variable types and contexts. For example, fully synthetic
categorical data uses summaries of i) ranking, and ii) re-normalized probability of the
true record being disclosed, as in Hu et al. (2014) in Section 3.3.1. Partially synthetic
continuous data, specifically in Wang and Reiter (2012) where synthetic precise ge-
ographies are released, summaries of i) a Euclidean distance between the intruder’s
guess of the geographies and the actual geographies , and ii) the count of the actual
cases in circle centered at the actual geographies within radius in i) are reported.
Unlike the summaries of attribute disclosure probabilities, summaries of identifi-
cation disclosure probabilities are more generally applicable, regardless of the variable
types and contexts. There are three summaries of identification disclosure probabili-
ties, which now we describe, following Drechsler and Hu (2018+).
We need the following notations and definitions before we present the three sum-
maries. Let ci be the number of records with the highest match probability for the
target ti; let Ti = 1 if the true match is among the ci units and Ti = 0 otherwise. Let
Ki = 1 when ciTi = 1 and Ki = 0 otherwise, and let N denote the total number of
target records. Finally, let Fi = 1 when ci(1 − Ti) = 1 and Fi = 0 otherwise, and let
s equal the number of records with ci = 1.
Now we can present the three widely used summaries (file-level) of identification
disclosure probabilities using the notations and definitions given above.
(i) The expected match risk:
n∑
i=1
Ti
ci
. (21)
When Ti = 1 and ci > 1, the contribution of unit i to the expected match
risk reflects the intruder randomly guessing at the correct match from the ci
candidates. In general, the higher the expected match risk, the higher the
identification disclosure risks.
(ii) The true match rate:
n∑
i=1
Ki
N
, (22)
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which is the percentage of true unique matches among the target records. In
general, the higher the true match rate, the higher the identification disclosure
risks.
(iii) The false match rate:
n∑
i=1
Fi
s
, (23)
which is the percentage of false matches among unique matches. In general, the
lower the false match rate, the higher the identification disclosure risks.
4.3 Selected examples
In this selected examples section, we want to show the readers a few different appli-
cations of partially synthetic data. We will illustrate the variables in t = (tAus, tAs)
for each application. All applications follow similar estimating procedure, and report
the same three summaries as presented in Section 4.2.6: i) the expected match risk,
ii) the true match rate, and iii) the false match rate.
For each application, we give a brief overview of the dataset(s) and research ques-
tions to provide the background. We also mention the synthesizers, but the details of
the synthesizers and the evaluation of the utility of the synthetic data are omitted.
Interested readers should refer to the cited papers for further information.
4.3.1 Partially synthetic categorical data 1
Reiter and Mitra (2009) aimed at partially synthesizing a sample of n = 2562 of the
1987 Survey of Youth in Custody. There are 23 variables on the file, and the authors
illustrated partially synthesizing two categorical variables, facility and race. Table 4
gives a partial list of the variables with their description, synthesis information and
whether known by the intruder. All other un-listed 20 variables are not known by
the intruder during the identification disclosure risks evaluation.
To synthesize the facility and race variables, the authors first use multinomial
regressions to synthesize facility. All other variables except race and some variables
causing multi-collinearity are included in the multinomial regressions as predictors.
Once all values of the facility variable are synthesized, the authors then synthesize race
using multinomial regressions. The predictors in these multinomial regressions include
all other variables plus indicator variables for facilities, except those causing multi-
collinearity. Reiter and Mitra (2009) note that the new values of race are simulated
conditional on the values of the synthetic facility indicators.
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Table 4: Selected variables used in the Reiter and Mitra (2009). Data taken from the
1987 Survey of Youth in Custody.
Variable Description Synthesized Known by intruder
Facility Categorical, 46 levels Yes Yes
Race Categorical, 5 levels Yes Yes
Ethnicity Categorical, 2 levels No Yes
For the identification disclosure risks evaluation, the authors considered facility
and race in tAs, and ethnicity in tAus. They also assumed that all targets are in the
sample, i.e. Pr(I = 2562 + 1 | t,ZAus,YAs) = 0.
4.3.2 Partially synthetic categorical data 2
Drechsler and Hu (2018+) aimed at comparing a few existing synthesizers on a large
German administrative database called the Integrated Employment Biographies (IEB)
to provide access to detailed geocoding information. There are approximately 22 mil-
lion records in the IEB. The authors considered 11 variables as listed in Table 5. We
include the variables, the description, whether a variable is synthesized, and whether
the variable is known by the intruder in the identification disclosure risks estimation
(i.e. whether in t) in this table. The authors in fact experimented with different
number of variables to be synthesized in order to provide higher protection. How-
ever, Table 5 considers the main synthesis approach, on which the authors presented
most of the utility and risks results too.
The authors considered three synthesizers. The first synthesizer is the DPMPM
synthesizer used in Hu et al. (2014), where the exact geocoding information was dis-
cretized into one unordered categorical variable, and the Dirichlet Process mixture
model on the joint of the 11 unordered categorical variables was estimated and used
to generate synthetic data. The second synthesizer is the CART synthesizer used in
Wang and Reiter (2012), where the exact geocoding information (the latitude and lon-
gitude) were treated as continuous and synthesized sequentially. We call this CART
synthesizer the CART continuous. The third synthesizer is also a CART synthesizer,
but similar to the DPMPM synthesizer, the exact geocoding information was dis-
cretized into one unordered categorical variable. We call this CART synthesizer the
CART categorical. All three synthesizers were applied to generate partially synthetic
IEB, where only the geocoding information was synthesized (either as categorical or
as continuous).
For the identification disclosure risks evaluation, the authors considered the exact
geocoding information in tAs, and sex, foreign, age, occupation, and industry of the
employer in tAus. Because the IEB is a census, the authors also assumed that all
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Table 5: Variables used in the Drechsler and Hu (2018+). Data taken from the IEB
database in Germany. Note that the exact geocoding information is recorded as
distance in meters from the point 52 northern latitude and 10 eastern longitude. It
is converted to categorical for two out of the three synthesizers.
Variable Description Synthesized Known by intruder
Exact geocoding info Longitude and latitude Yes Yes
Sex Male, female No Yes
Foreign Yes, no No Yes
Age 6 categories No Yes
Education 6 categories No No
Occupation level 7 categories No No
Occupation 12 categories No Yes
Industry of the employer 15 categories No Yes
Wage 10 categories (quantiles) No No
Distance to work 5 categories No No
ZIP code 2,063 ZIP code levels No No
targets are in Z, i.e. Pr(I = n + 1 | t,ZAus,YAs) = 0. They reported the expected
match risk, the true match rate, and the false match rate for different synthesizers.
While CART categorical synthesizer produced synthetic data with the highest utility,
the identification disclosure risks may be deemed too high, therefore the authors
recommended two approaches for increasing the level of protection: i) aggregate the
geocoding information to a higher level, and ii) synthesizes additional variables in the
dataset. Drechsler and Hu (2018+) preferred ii) over i), and interested readers are
referred to the paper for their discussion and general recommendations.
4.3.3 Partially synthetic categorical and continuous data
Drechsler and Reiter (2010) aimed at partially synthesizing a sample of n = 51016
of the March 2000 U.S. CPS. The authors in fact treated the sample as a census to
illustrate their sampling with synthesis methodology, but for our illustration purpose,
we will ignore the differences. There are 10 variables on the file, and the authors illus-
trated partially synthesizing three variables (2 are categorical and 1 is continuous).
Table 6 gives the list of the variables with their description, synthesis information
and whether known by the intruder.
The authors synthesized age, race, and marital status sequentially using CART
synthesizers. The synthetic values were generated through the Bayesian bootstrap.
For the identification disclosure risks evaluation, the authors considered race, mar-
tial status, and age in tAs, and sex in tAus. They reported the expected match risk,
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Table 6: Variables used in the Drechsler and Reiter (2010). Data taken from the
March 2000 U.S. CPS. HH stands for household.
Variable Description Synthesized Known by intruder
Sex Male, female No Yes
Race Categorical, 4 levels Yes Yes
Marital status Categorical, 7 levels Yes Yes
Highest education level Categorical, 16 levels No No
Age Range 0-90 Yes Yes
# of people in HH 1-16 No No
# of people in HH under 18 0-11 No No
Household property taxes 0, 1-99,997 No No
Social security payments 0, 1-50,000 No No
Household income -21,011-768,742 No No
the true match rate, and the false match rate for a selected subset of 1089 sensitive
cases.
4.4 Discussion and comments
Current practices focus on the three summaries of identification disclosure probabil-
ities (the expected match risk, the true match rate, and the false match rate) are
important and useful file-level measures. While important and comprehensive, there
might be additional useful measures worth being developed.
R, the meta-data released about the reason why records were selected for syn-
thesis, is usually dropped because of lack of information. More simulation studies
with different scenarios of R could potentially provide insight on the effect of R in
identification disclosure risks assessment.
The assumption about what the intruder knows (the “Known by intruder” column
in Tables 4, 5, 6) when performing matching can be arbitrary, and the calculated
identification disclosure risks can be very sensitive to the assumption. To the best
of our knowledge, no work on the sensitivity of identification disclosure risks to the
intruder’s knowledge assumption has been done, which is an important future work
path.
Another important future work direction is matching with synthesized continuous
attributes. As discussed in Section 4.2.2, matching numerical components of ZAs
within some acceptable distance is preferred to exact matching. For example, if the
continuous income attribute is synthesized, the intruder can declare a match if the
synthesized income of a record is within the radius of an absolute value (e.g. $10,000)
from the original income value, or within the radius of a relative value (e.g. 20% of the
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original income value). How to select the radius most likely depends on the statistical
agency’s threshold of what is considered as acceptable risks. Further research on the
radius selection and evaluation of effects of the radius selection is needed to provide
guidelines to data disseminators.
We primarily focus on estimating identification disclosure risks for synthetic data
in this paper. However, the Duncan-Lambert framework developed in Reiter (2005a)
can be applied to masked data undergone SDL techniques (e.g. data swapping, adding
random noise, and micro-aggregation). Interested readers can refer to the general
framework of Reiter (2005a) for further details of the estimation process and examples
with SDL techniques.
5 Summary
Estimating disclosure risks of synthetic data is an important aspect of evaluating
the usefulness and feasibility of releasing public available synthetic microdata. In
this paper, we present recent developments of Bayesian methods to disclosure risks
assessment, in particular of the two types of risks: attribute disclosure and identifica-
tion disclosure. We present the Bayesian thinking, highlight key steps, and illustrate
with real synthetic data applications. We demonstrate the flexibility of Bayesian
methods in modeling the beliefs of data intruders, as well as the interpretability of
subjective Bayesian probabilities in terms of the disclosure risks evaluation. We also
discuss and comment on limitations of current methods and some possible future
research paths.
Our main discussion and comments have been presented separately for the at-
tribute disclosure and identification disclosure. However, there are some common
points worth mentioning here. For one, we have exclusively presented on assessment
processes based on the assumption that any record the intruder intends to make in-
ference about is in the released sample. More research should be done to evaluate
the uncertainty from sampling, especially for the fully synthetic case. For another,
we have exclusively presented on assessment based on synthetic data. We would like
to see more research on Bayesian methods for disclosure risks assessment based on
other perturbation techniques, including the SDL techniques. We recognize that not
all agencies are comfortable to generate and release synthetic microdata yet, therefore
disclosure risks assessment based on other perturbation techniques is an important
and promising research path.
Finally, there are other forms of disclosure risks that are not currently researched
on extensively. For example, for both fully and partially synthetic data, one can ask
the question “can intruder accurately infer from the synthetic data that some record
with particular values is in the confidential data?” We believe such disclosure scenarios
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and other forms should be further researched on, providing a more comprehensive
disclosure assessment of synthetic data, and more generally, of perturbed microdata.
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